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Abstract. This paper reviews and interrogates theories of climate science 
denialism, and climate science skepticism, from a Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) perspective, and proceeds as follows: (1) Compare work by Jasanoff & 
Simmet, and by Collins, Evans & Weinel, on post-truth rhetoric, theories of 
expertise, and managing climate science denialism. (2) Introduce particular 
boundary drawing norms that I view as promising in potentially persuading 
publics to support mitigation responses to climate change. (3) Review work by 
Jylhä and by MacWilliams on the politics and demographics of climate science 
denialists (4) Argue that recent work by Kenner provides a model for effectively 
engaging local communities in climate science epistemology which could be 
fruitfully extended using social science work reviewed in this paper. (5) Conclude 
that there is plausibly fruitful political negotiation to be done by engaging 
conservative people to envision desired futures and compare those visions with 
the emerging climate. 
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1. ON POST-TRUTH AND EXPERTISE 
 
This section reviews some recent prominent views about how STS 
should approach climate science denialism. This paper follows 
Lewandowsky et al. (2015) in the view that there is broad scientific 
consensus on climate change, which Lewandowsky defines as “the 
agreement that (a) the Earth is warming and (b) most of that 
warming has been due to human greenhouse gas emissions” 
Christopher Caulfield – Fostering Community Engagement 
106 
(Lewandowsky 2015, 1). Opponents of these views, which I’ll refer 
to as climate science denialists, have frequently emphasized 
scientific uncertainty in order to argue against regulations designed 
to mitigate climate change. The topic of scientific certainty, and 
uncertainty, is thus central to the analysis of climate science 
denialism. This section considers the production of public doxastic 
attitudes of certainty (or ignorance) through the employment of 
post-truth rhetoric, which eschews empirical contestation in favour 
of emotional appeals to authority.  
The relation between post-truth rhetoric and climate science 
denialists has gained increasing attention from STS scholars. Collins, 
Evans & Weinel (2017) have argued, roughly, that the social 
constructivist turn in STS work, which emphasized continuities 
between science and politics, has “opened up the cognitive terrain 
to those concerned to enhance the impact of democratic politics on 
science but, in so doing, it opened that terrain for all forms of 
politics, including populism and that of the radical right-wing” 
(Collins 2017, 581). They have advocated that STS should respond 
to climate science denialism by emphasizing conditions of legitimate 
expertise, of scientific experts, in evaluating claims about climate 
science. STS, they aver, is expert in expertise. On this view, by 
limiting the people who are assessed to be experts in accordance 
with some norms of science, STS can make a uniquely valuable 
contribution to work on climate science (and other post-truth 
related topics).  
By contrast, Jasanoff & Simmet (2017) have argued against 
establishing privileged epistemologies of expertise. They contend 
that the debates around climate change science, such as carbon 
taxes, have failed to adequately engage with everyday concerns of 
non-experts, such as “the experience of hardscrabble working lives 
with legitimate worries, grievances and desires divergent from those 
of a state perceived as unduly intrusive or an educated, expert elite” 
(Jasanoff 2017, 765ff). Crucially, Jasanoff & Simmet contend that 
topics which are taken up by post-truth rhetorics, such as climate 
science and related regulations, are actually stand-ins for 
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disagreements about the fundamental values of our society. In 
Jasanoff & Simmet's words,  
 
Americans’ ignorance of each other across economic and class divides has 
created a world of blanket accusations about being on the ‘wrong side of 
history’. This leads to a climate in which fundamental disagreements over 
values are treated as if they can be simply overridden and destroyed by facts 
rather than listened to and reasoned with to create a knowledge base that feels 
truly shared. Yet, what calls for attention in our present crisis – a crisis of 
democracy as well as a ‘climate crisis’ – is precisely this lack of shared 
imaginations about the future of American, and indeed global, society. 
(Jasanoff 2017, 765) 
 
That is to say, per Jasanoff & Simmet, contests regarding climate 
science have failed to make adequate progress in changing legal 
structures precisely because the participants of the contest have 
failed to conduct sufficient political negotiations about what values 
to pursue as a body politic. Climate change activists, including those 
in STS, should aim to create ‘shared imaginations’ about the future 
which ‘feels truly shared’ to the participants. Appeals to an epistemic 
privilege of expertise would fail because the contest is political, not 
factual.  
Jasanoff & Simmet is in broad conformity with a Foucault’s 
(1972) account of scientific knowledge production as a ritual which 
encodes value and power. Consider the following quotation from 
Foucault on the topic of the production of knowledge. 
  
The history of ideas, then, is the discipline of beginnings and ends, the 
description of obscure continuities and returns, the reconstitution of 
developments in the linear form of history...it shows how scientific knowledge 
is diffused, gives rise to philosophical concepts...it shows how problems, 
notions, themes may emigrate from the philosophical field where they were 
formulated to scientific or political discourses. (Foucault 1972, 137) 
  
That is to say, per Foucault, the history of ideas illustrates how 
notions and problems can migrate between domains of science and 
political discourses; science is political. Jasanoff & Simmet extend 
that Foucauldian analytical framework by emphasizing how the 
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rhetoric relating to climate science lies at the intersection of the 
scientific factual claim and fundamental questions of political value. 
 
 
2. PROMISING FRAMEWORKS FOR BOUNDARY DRAWING 
 
Jasanoff & Simmet note that the problem of identifying knowledge 
is ancient, and that the epistemology of science has gained renewed 
urgency in the face of harms associated with climate change and 
public contestation regarding what counts as legitimate climate 
science. This section reviews the rhetorics of climate science and 
discusses related STS theories of expertise. To give one example of 
the rhetoric of climate science denialism, consider a view articulated 
by Scott Pruitt, the Environmental Protection Agency 
Administrator, who said, “I think that measuring with precision 
human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do 
and there’s tremendous disagreement about the degree of impact 
(…). So no, I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the 
global warming that we see” (Chiacu & Volcovici 2017). That is to 
say, per Pruitt, disagreement amongst experts about human impacts 
on climate change are sufficient to warrant his conclusion that 
humans are not a “primary contributor to (…) global warming”, and 
therefore governments should refrain from taking steps to limit 
greenhouse gases (e.g. a carbon tax).  
By contrast, Oreskes & Conway (2010a) support a view that there 
is an overwhelming consensus among scientific experts that 
anthropogenic factors are a key contributing factor in climate 
change. They write that the scientific consensus on anthropocentric 
climate change is “unequivocal” (Oreskes 2010a, 169). Oreskes & 
Conway emphasize the crucial role of a group of scientists, including 
Bill Nierenberg and Fred Singer, allied with conservative think 
tanks, in generating scientific controversy regarding climate science. 
They cite a 1979 report on climate science by Nierenberg, Schilling 
& Nordhaus, produced for the US National Academy of Sciences 
under the Carter Administration. That report is, per Oreskes & 
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Conway, unusually disjointed in that, unlike past reports, the 
Nierenberg report was not signed, in total, by all authors. It has 
individually signed chapters, a point which they contend indicates 
the internal incoherence of the views of the authors. The executive 
summary, they report, “sided with the economists” who counselled 
against taking measures to limit CO2 emissions, not the natural 
scientists who counselled in favour of proactive policies to reduce 
CO2 emissions (Oreskes 2010a, 177). Oreskes & Conway present 
documents indicating that powerful interests, such as the energy 
lobby and “oil-rich states”, actively sought to deceive public 
perceptions of climate science by paying for research that 
conformed with their profit interests. Summing up a troubling 
picture, they conclude, “[the] divergence between the state of the 
science and how it was presented in the major media helped make 
it easy for our government to do nothing about global 
warming...Scientifically, global warming was an established fact. 
Politically, global warming was dead” (Ibidem, 215).  
 
 
3. THE POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CLIMATE SCIENCE DENIALISM 
 
Jasanoff & Simmet’s call for STS work to engage politically with 
climate science denialists intersects with fascinating empirical 
research which shows that those who engage in climate science 
denial are typically white males with conservative political views, 
termed the ‘conservative male effect’, a topic of recent research. For 
instance, one empirical study of climate science denialism by Jylhä 
et al. found that “[the conservative male effect] can be explained by 
the endorsement of group-based social hierarchies as indexed by 
social dominance orientation” (Jylhä 2016, 184). That is to say, the 
prevalence of climate science denialism amongst conservative males 
is partly explained by their predisposition to endorse group-based 
social hierarchies. Such social science findings can help activists and 
theorists to better understand their audiences as they work to engage 
climate science denialists. As noted by Wibeck (2014), climate 
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change activists should be mindful that the public is not uniform, it 
is heterogeneous, and distinct target groups may respond 
differentially to various “interpretative frames” regarding climate 
change (Wibeck 2014, 401).  
The relation between authoritarian politics and climate science 
denialists can be illuminated by Merton’s (1942/73) seminal 
sociology of science. This paper extends Merton’s account to 
illuminate contemporary debates about the boundaries between 
science, pseudoscience, and science denialism. Merton proposed 
that science has a socially constructed “ethos”; thus, Merton aims to 
describe, and prescribe, norms of scientific inquiry. Merton’s 
warning about the dangers of fascist epistemologies of science 
intersects with the political challenges of our present post-truth era, 
with implications for theories of climate science denialism. 
Commentators have for years noted a global lurch to the political 
right which is demonstrated by Brexit and the election of Trump, 
whose platform included authoritarian policies which are 
discriminatory toward perceived outgroup members, such as 
political refugees and asylum seekers (Taub 2016). According to an 
analysis of voter demographics in the 2016 election by MacWilliams 
(2016), “Trump’s rise is in part the result of authoritarian voters’ 
response to his unvarnished, us-versus-them rhetoric” 
(MacWilliams 2016, 716). This section reviews research linking 
conservative voter’s response to Trump’s authoritarian rhetoric and 
policies with his administration’s forceful climate science denialism 
and his initiatives favourable to the fossil fuel industry.  
Groundbreaking reporting by Banerjee et al. (2016) describing a 
campaign by the oil company Exxon over a period of 40 years to 
discredit climate science. In conformity with the aims of that 40-
year long campaign, there has been a proliferation of climate science 
denialists. These denialists are overwhelmingly allied with right-
wing, and business-friendly, political positions. The profit motive of 
the fossil fuel industry is the most elegant and plausible explanation 
for that lengthy campaign. In this sense, ignorance about climate 
change was produced by the social structure of capitalism and greed, 
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transferred through popular media, itself subject to the influence of 
capitalism. Trump has nurtured connections with the fossil fuel 
industry, especially coal, and his administration has doubted that 
climate change is substantially anthropogenic, while the 
Environmental Protection Agency has sought to loosen regulations 
of climate change causing fossil fuel emissions and standards.  
Oreskes et al. (2018) have extensively described the ways that 
fossil fuel companies designed and contributed to public 
controversy regarding climate science. A constellation of 
corporations and libertarian think-tanks worked together to 
construct ignorance through the publication of works by scientists 
which contradicted previous research on climate science. In their 
words, “during the early 1980s, anti-environmentalism had (…) 
taken root in a network of conservative and libertarian think-tanks 
in Washington (…) the CATO Institute (…) the Heritage 
Foundation (…) the Marshall Institute - variously promoted 
business interests and ‘free market’ economic policies, and the 
rollback of environmental, health, safety, and labor protections (…). 
Much of the funding (…) came from the fossil fuel industry 
[including] Exxon Mobil” (Oreskes 2018, 160). This paper follows 
Jasanoff & Simmet in viewing Oreskes’ work as squarely in favour 
of establishing privileged epistemologies of expertise. We can see 
privileging of certain epistemologies in the key conclusion defended 
by Oreskes, namely that the scientists who have been prominent in 
contesting anthropogenic climate change have engaged in 
illegitimate knowledge production; they are illegitimate experts. 
Oreskes & Conway (2010b) sum up: “One reason that the public is 
confused is that people have been trying to confuse them, in large 
part by intentionally waging campaigns of doubt against climate 
science...It works because if people think the science is contentious, 
they are unlikely to support public policies that rely on that science” 
(Oreskes 2010b, 686) The work of distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate knowledge production has received voluminous 
attention; in the following section, I review some of that work which 
I find to be promising. My aim here is not to side with Collins, Evans 
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& Weinel in favour of expertise boundary drawing, and against 
Jasanoff & Simmet’s injunction to dispense with such boundary 
drawing in favour of political negotiation. Rather, my aim is to note 
what I take to be promising suggestions for boundary drawing that 
could persuade anthropogenic climate change sceptics to reconsider 
both their politics and their beliefs about climate change. 
Hansson (2017) has helpfully developed a taxonomy of forms of 
knowledge production which he describes as deviant. His aim it to 
counter climate science denialism, which contends that “poses a 
serious threat to human health and the long-term sustainability of 
human civilization” (Hansson 2017, 39). Following Hansson, this 
section distinguishes science from science denialism by articulating 
a theory of “deviant criteria of assent” (ibidem). For example, 
extending Oreskes, Hansson contends that climate science denialists 
have “fabricated fake controversies”, an epistemically illegitimate 
activity (ibidem). Per Hansson, other deviant criteria of assent 
include: 
•  Cherry picking information – failure to evaluate the whole body 
of evidence. 
•  Neglect of refuting information – refusing to acknowledge new 
evidence that is contrary to previously embraced, intuitively 
appealing ideas. 
•  Lack of competence – climate science denialists typically lack 
academic credentials. 
•  Inability to publish in peer-reviewed media – climate science 
denialists have not been able to publish widely in peer-reviewed 
journals and media. 
•  Use of conspiracy theories – climate science denialists often 
evoke vaguely defined liberal conspiracies. 
 
The granular epistemic framework that Hansson offers is in broad 
conformity with the kind of analysis of expertise advocated by 
Collins, Evans & Weinel. In addition to describing deviant criteria 
of assent, Hansson also sketches some demographic commonalities 
among science denialist activists; denialists are overwhelmingly 
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“male” and they frequently connect their climate science denial 
activities with “right-wing” political positions (Hansson 2017, 43ff). 
Following a Foucauldian analysis of power, we can view the 
alignment of right-wing political positions with climate science 
denialism as rooted in a complex, ever-shifting arrangement of 
interests that include political, economic, scientific, cultural, 
gendered, and racialized. These criteria of deviant can plausibly be 
used to engage publics in the kind of political negotiation endorsed 
by Jasanoff, offering publics a framework to refine their own criteria 
for evaluating knowledge claims. What do the social sciences tell us 
about the psychological characteristics associated with right-wing 
authoritarian politics and connections with climate science?  
 
 
3.1. AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION AND RIGHT-WING POLITICS 
 
The psychology of people who favour right-wing authoritarian 
politics has been researched by Halperin & Bar-Tal (2011) in the 
context of Jewish interpretation of novel information in connection 
with the ongoing conflict with Palestinians. The role of openness to 
novel information is crucially important for people who hold right-
wing political views. Briefly, Halperin & Bar-Tal, found that 
“unwillingness to be exposed to new information that may 
contradict already held views about the conflict restricts the views 
of society members and ultimately supports the continuation of the 
conflict [with Palestinians]. These members tend to use superficial 
analyses of incoming information and search for information 
consistent with already-held knowledge (Halperin 2011, 647). On 
this account, traumatic experiences, e.g. loss of human life, is 
predictive of fearful and defensive postures which are in turn 
predictive of information processing. Those who experience great 
pain are more likely to close-minded to new information which 
contradicts preconceived beliefs.  
By way of positive suggestion, Halperin & Bar-Tal suggest one 
way to “unfreeze” widely held beliefs, namely by introducing novel 
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instigating beliefs which “show incompatibility between the desired 
future, on the one hand, and the emerging future and/or the current 
state and/or the perceived past, on the other hand” (Halperin 2011, 
647). Shifting back to the present topic of science denialism, it 
follows that one way to unfreeze the science denialist claims is to 
demonstrate that there is a harmful emerging future which is 
incompatible with the broad values and aims such climate denialists. 
I here note that such potential to unfreeze the science denialist 
claims represents a promising avenue for further STS work which 
would embrace both Jasanoff’s call to really listen to and negotiate 
with climate science denialists, while also embracing, in part, the call 
of Collins, Evans & Weinel to retain some place for privileged 
expertise (in this case, privileged expertise of the findings of 
Halperin & Bar-Tal, which provides an empirical basis for framing 
climate change discussions).  
The potential for illustrations of harmful emerging futures to 
bring productive public attention (as opposed to avoidance) to 
climate change has been supported by a variety of other researchers. 
For instance, Henly-Shepard, Gray & Cox (2015) have worked with 
coastal island communities to raise awareness about hazards and 
risks associated with climate change, explore adaptation strategies, 
and foster social trust and learning of diverse stakeholders. 
Specifically, the research conducted “a series of iterative 
participatory modeling workshops using fuzzy-logic cognitive 
mapping (…) community committee represented, explored and 
actively questioned their beliefs about the natural hazards that their 
community faces (…) the modelling process allowed the committee 
to represent the communities’ dynamic nature, run tsunami hazard 
scenarios to quantify potential direct and indirect effects, and 
explicitly compare trade-offs of competing adaptation strategies” 
(Henly-Shepard 2015, 109). Such community work to emphasize 
local risks associated with climate change are a promising 
opportunity for climate change activists to both leverage local pieces 
of knowledge about local climate change challenges, while 
informing the discussion in ways that have been empirically shown 
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to foster community engagement (as opposed to burnout, apathy, 
or avoidance). 
 
  
3.2. A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
 
Work by Kenner (2018) of Drexel University’s Center for Science, 
Technology, and Society in Philadelphia has aimed to help people 
to become aware of localized effects of climate change, such as 
increased incidence and severity of asthma attacks, and increased 
risk of heat stroke. Kenner’s work illustrates the potential for 
climate change activists to further involve faith-based organisations 
and other community groups, as well as technologies such as phone 
apps in order to mitigate health risks associated with climate change 
(Kenner, 2016; Fortun et al., 2014). Such local community 
involvement expands upon Kenner’s push for an embodied, 
transcorporeality approach to climate change and other 
environmental problems. Kenner has noted that, in her view, a key 
challenge is that climate science is not authoritative in the minds of 
many Americans. Her work seeks to highlight how some climate 
science has unhelpfully emphasized decontextualized phenomena, 
i.e. knowledge abstracted from felt time-space, thereby undermining 
the work of scientists and policymakers who need to gain public 
buy-in on the reality of global climate change. Thus, Kenner seeks 
to ‘bring climate change home’, joining Jasanoff in seeking to engage 
the political concerns of everyday folk and practising what Kinchy 
et al. (2018) have called ‘engaged STS work’ integrating the lived 
realities of communities with environmental justice and climate 
justice work. In this sense, Kenner’s work rejects Oreskes & 
Conway’s emphasis on expertise and scientific consensus, instead of 
focusing on those who have been sidelined by expert discourses of 
climate science activists.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, this paper has discussed how research on climate 
science denialism can be informed by social theories of knowledge 
production and social influence, including those of Merton, 
Foucault, and Harding. I have sought to balance the calls of Jasanoff 
& Simmet to engage in political negotiation with the calls of Collins, 
Evans & Weinel to retain some notion of epistemically privileged 
knowledge production. Recent work by Kenner strikes that balance 
by engaging communities to generate awareness of localized effects 
of climate change and enable the kind of political negotiation that 
Jasanoff & Simmet advocate while integrating the practice of 
critically evaluating knowledge claims. I suggest that community 
engagement work like Kenner’s could be fruitfully extended by 
integrating lessons from Halperin & Bar-Tal showing that widely 
held beliefs can be unfrozen by showing how some desired future 
is incompatible with an emerging future. There is plausibly fruitful 
work to be done engaging conservative white males to envision 
desired futures and compare with the emerging new climate. The 
following work by Jylhä and by MacWilliams may be better 
equipped to make sense of climate science denialism by 
understanding the fascinating associations between it and 
conservative political views. Finally, work by Hansson on deviant 
criteria of assent could be leveraged to help publics to identify 
deviant knowledge claims, enabling further informed evaluations of 
climate science denialist claims.  
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